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civil and criminal procedure and contends that strictly criminal approaches were
intrinsically unsuitable to the resolution of civil disputes. The author concurs,
however, with the traditional assumption on the function of magistrates, who, he
insists, weighed cultural norms and local customs more heavily than codified law.
Philip c.c. Huang, on the other hand, arrives at the opposite conclusion. Through
his careful analysis of 221 civil cases involving land, debt, marriage, and inheri-
tance in the Baxian, Baodi, and Dan-Xin courts, Huang convincingly argues that
magistrates did not act as mediators but as judges, strictly observing the code.
Kathryn Bernhardt's chapter is a penetrating study of divorce in the
Republican period. The civil code adopted in 1927-1931, Bernhardt points out, not
only contained many features compatible with the Qing code and social custom
but also redefined the legal rights of individuals in the family and provided for a
liberal divorce law, even allowing easy "no fault" mutual consent divorce, sur-
passing its Swiss and German models. To the author, actual legal practice, seen
through some 200 cases in Beijing and Shanghai courts, was the manifestation of
the tension between legal ideals and the backward social reality; women of the
Republican period found it far easier to obtain a divorce than women of the Qing,
but divorce did not become commonplace.
In her essay on the legal profession, Alison W. Conner surveys the regulatory
framework established under the 1912 and 1927 statutes and the outlook of some
10,000 lawyers during the 1920s and 1930s. Although it suffered from such short-
comings as low standards, a shortage of lawyers, and negative government atti-
tude, the legal profession, Conner insists, developed a "self-conscious identity"
and achieved a reasonably high status for its members in Shanghai and other com-
mercial centers. Madeleine Zelin sees the beginnings of new commercial law in
the civil disputes handled by the new Chamber of Commerce in Zigong (the pro-
duction center of the Sichuan salt industry) during the Guomindang period. Zelin
asserts that the Chamber of Commerce, to which the people turned to protect their
business interests, performed the judicial functions of the official court system,
while effectively utilizing Qing customary law of settling business disputes by
mediation.
All in all, Civil Law in Qing and Republican China is a significant contribu-
tion to Chinese legal history. The editors' succinct introduction unifies the essays
into a coherent whole, along the dual themes of continuity and change. As the first
volume of a new series, Law, Society, and Culture in China, this book has set a
high standard. Scholars would look forward, in the subsequent volumes, to equally
important but more detailed studies on specific topics and on regional diversities.
YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA
The University ofTexas at El Paso
RICHARD A. POSNER, Overcoming Law. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
Press, 1995. x, 580 pp. $39.95.
This fine book amplifies and applies the pragmatic theories which Posner-a
founder of the law and economics movement and currently a federal appellate
judge-first propounded in The Problems ofJurisprudence.! Posner argues that a
I. R. A. Posner, The Problems of}urisprudence, (Cambridge, 1990).
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fusion of liberalism (a la Mill), economics, and pragmatism "can transform legal
theory" (p. 29). He supports this thesis both by applying his pragmatic approach to
analyze specific issues, and by using it to critique the legal analysis of dozens of
other scholars.
The original applications are not nearly as successful as Posner's critique of
other legal scholars, which makes up the bulk of the book. For example, Posner's
behavioral analysis of homosexuals (chapter 26) and judges (chapter 3) seems
inconsistent with his own definition of pragmatism, particularly his claim that the
pragmatist is "skeptical about claims that we can have justified confidence in hav-
ing arrived at the final truth about anything" (p. 5). The mathematical formulas
and unqualified, deductive reasoning in these chapters do not naturally admit
skepticism or pragmatic self-doubt.
The real value of the book comes, however, in Posner's powerful criticism of
more than two dozen of the most influential legal scholars of the day. On the
whole, the essays call on legal scholars to develop and rely on more empiricism
about likely consequences of different legal rules. On this score, the bottom-up or
analogic reasoning of constitutional law theorists-which Posner claims "is not
reasoning but is at best preparatory to reasoning" (178)-is a particular focus of
attack.
But, the essays also display great humanity. For example, in reviewing a
book analyzing the eager complicity of German courts during the Nazi period,
Posner writes: "[These judges] repeatedly rejected positivism, and did so with a
brutal forthrightness that should make our judicial activists, realists, utilitarians,
and pragmatists squirm. (I am one of those pragmatists, and I'm squirming)"
(p. 155). He later draws even more specific implications for our own criminal
jurisprudence:
Our retention, indeed our expanding usc, of capital punishments (many for intrin-
sically minor, esoteric, archaic, or victimless offenses), our adoption of pretrial
detention, as a result of which some criminal defendants languish in jail for years
awaiting trial, and our enormous prison and jail population, which has now
passed the one-million mark, mark us as the most penal of civilized nations. This
is a disturbing state of affairs-justifiable perhaps, remote from Nazi justice, but
problematic all the same. (p. 157).
Posner's unease even leads him to question, at least implicitly, his own possible
over-reliance on law and economic analysis: u(J]udges on the one hand should not
be eager enlisters in popular movements, but on the other hand should not allow
themselves to become so immersed in professional culture that they are oblivious
to the human consequences of their decisions." (p. 158).
The book also demonstrates that Posner has developed formidable rhetorical
skills. Not only is he a masterful and lucid essayist, but he now is willing to ana-
lyze and even deploy some of the verbal tropes of his own critics. For example, in
reviewing Patricia William's analysis of the Baby M. case, Posner notes "Mrs.
Stern [the wife in the infertile couple] is made invisible." (p. 374).
I was slightly disappointed that the original analysis of policy issues was not
as successful as Posner's wide-ranging criticism of others. But attempting to pro-
vide a more unified structure would be somewhat inconsistent with the pragmatist
thrust of the book itself. While the book claims an overarching thesis, pragmatists
by their very nature are doomed to be foxes instead of hedgehogs. Posner at times
still reverts to dry, reductive analysis, but his prose on the whole displays a new-
found confidence and spirit. The specter of a sitting federal judge speaking so
freely about "overcoming law" and proposing the necessity and appropriateness of
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judicial activism is itself jarring.
It is somewhat ironic that Posner has devoted so much of his scholarship to
studying the allocation of scarce resources, because Posner himself seems to have
no capacity constraints. One can only be in awe at the sheer volume of his work
and at its breadth and quality. His critics persist in claiming that Posner is only
capable of spinning out unworldly and reductive theories, but the essays in this
book amply demonstrate that he has become a persuasive rhetorician who can illu-
minate vast areas of the legal landscape with pragmatic reason and compassion.
IAN AYRES
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ALAN WATSON, The Spirit ofRoman Law. Athens Ga. and London: University
of Georgia Press, 1995. xix, 241 pp.
I am made a little uneasy by the concept of a legal system's having a "spirit,"
though of course the expression has a pedigree. Since this book is the first of a
new series on legal spirits under Alan Watson's editorship, it offers an occasion to
ask just what one is looking for when one seeks the spirit and looks past the flesh.
Certainly, Watson's hardboiled common sense is proof against anything mystical
or mysterious. The book is about some salient general features of Roman law and
not about the rules for their own sakes. The only reason to make the least fuss
over the conception is that a certain ambiguity affects the discussion. In a predom-
inant sense, the book is about a mentality, a simple translation of "spirit"-that of
the Roman jurists, the socially prestigious consultants to the citizens, the magis-
trates, the courts, and ultimately, the Emperor who over centuries, with little
change of style from age to age, largely shaped the private law. At moments, how-
ever, one is left wondering how far Watson means to go in attributing characteris-
tics of a system to the habits of mind of a caste. Substantial freedom of contract
(within strictures of form), testamentary freedom, marital law based on consent
rather than ceremony, legal non-interference between master and slave-are such
Romanisms (mainly reviewed in Chapter 14) owing to the monopolization of legal
lore by the heirs of an aristocratic tradition of interpretation isolated from life
(Watson's essential thesis about them)? In asking the question, I do not imply an
answer one way or the other, only that causal relationships, including uncertainty
about them, could sometimes be made more explicit.
Nor is ingratitude for an interesting and useful book implied in my most gen-
eral criticism: as Watson says with complete forthrightness, he is synthesizing
from his prolific earlier work and in some places reproducing pieces of it directly.
The procedure results in an unevenness of exposition. So far is the book intended
to be accessible to the previously uninstructed that it starts with a very basic
sketch of Roman law. But as it progresses and illustrative material is abundantly
introduced, there is insufficient attention to whether a beginner or common reader
will understand the legal particularities presented and be able to construct the
steps from those material data to the spiritual conclusion. It is probably a good
rule that when a scholar as qualified as Watson is by learning and years of lively
reflection sits down to address a grand theme for a general audience, he should
start over with blank paper, spelling out the argument from the beginning with that
audience in view. The tedium of saying again in new language what one has
already said in more technical contexts, and explaining more than an expert can
